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I am honored to join the discussion of Michelle Lamont’s presentation. 
Lamont, like other noteworthy Francophone observers before her, has done 
much over the years to illuminate the sociological curiosity that is American 
society. “From Having to Being” is a thought-provoking description of and 
prescription for a society that is being battered by strong and regressive 
political and economic shocks.
Lamont and I agree on the broad story: The United States has in the 
last 40 or so years experienced growing economic inequality fostered by 
and, in turn, fostering an increasingly powerful politics hostile to 
government, favorable to the wealthy, and aggressively infused with pro-
market ideology. These developments have injured most Americans. Nations 
under the influence of the United States have undergone similar changes 
although most western societies have avoided the worst (not Britain, alas).
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Despite such broad agreement, my role here is to raise issues with 
Lamont’s analysis in hopes of widening our shared understanding. I explore 
her “diagnosis” of our condition and then only briefly turn to her 
“prescription.” In the first regard, diagnosis, I critique three of Lamont’s 
empirical claims: that neoliberalism has fostered ethnic hostility; that it has 
accentuated materialist impulses; and that it has increased angst particularly
among the upper middle class. These empirical explorations lead to 
modifying Lamont’s account in two ways: (a) More forces have been at work 
than just economic reordering; and (b) the economic reordering is important 
because it created insecurity rather than because it changed the culture. 
Caveat: I, unlike Lamont, am qualified only to discuss the American case 
(Fischer 2010).
Diagnosis
Lamont argues that “neoliberalism”–roughly, market-oriented 
institutions and thought–is “narrowing definitions of [individual] worth” and 
thus “feed[ing] a mental health crisis in the upper middle class” and leading 
average people to “embrace” impossible-to-achieve “standards of worth,” 
with the further consequence of “deepen[ing] the stigmatization of low-
income populations” and “groups often stereotypically associated with 
poverty....”–i.e., ethnic minorities (see pp. [c. p. 27 in draft]).
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Stigmatization of Minorities. First, the least complex empirical 
question: Is the rise of neoliberalism associated with greater hostility toward 
minorities? No. Americans’ attitudes and behaviors toward minorities have 
improved in recent decades. For example, in the 1970s, 19 percent of white 
respondents to the American General Social Survey (GSS) said that they 
would vote against a “qualified” black nominated by their own party for 
president; in the 2000s, only 4 percent did.1 Whites became less likely to 
endorse invidious explanations of black-white achievement differences.2 As 
to immigrants, a 2018 Gallup Poll report headlined “Record-High 75% of 
Americans Say Immigration Is Good Thing” notes that “a record-low number 
of Americans–29%–[say] that immigration into the U.S. should be decreased”
(Brenan 2018). These are, of course, only words and may mask true “racial 
resentment.” Turn, then, to other indicators.
Lamont makes much of cultural markers. In recent decades, blacks 
have been increasingly represented at the peaks of celebrity status–for 
example, as Oscar award winners for cinema, as Emmy award winners for 
1 Own analysis of the GSS data, here and below.
2 These are the RACDIF1-4 questions in the GSS. Whites became less likely to 
endorse any  explanation, including discrimination, although “lack of will” remained 
the most popular. The “thermometer” questions Lamont graphed are not 
persuasive. For one, the changes are minor and easily understood as resulting from 
Republican backlash to Obama. For another, if the trends were rooted in 
neoliberalism, the negative trend should have started many years earlier.
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television, and as quarterbacks, the premier and “intellectual” position in 
professional American football.3 Blacks have increasingly become American 
role models. The deepest indicator of stigma is a barrier to intermarriage. 
Yet, black-white intermarriage rates have soared in recent decades, across 
all age groups, as have rates of native-born whites marrying native-born 
minorities and the foreign-born (Pew Research Center 2017; Qian and Lichter
2011). Indeed, blacks’ improvement on some social indicators masks general
working-class deterioration.4
Yet, if racism is in decline, how can one explain Trump? Trump’s 
victory was basically an accident–the collision of explicit appeals to white 
nationalism, Russian meddling, FBI clumsiness, and a weird electoral system.
Trump’s unexpected popularity underlines my point: Far better than other 
Republicans had, Trump mobilized Americans who felt culturally threatened 
and they felt threatened in great measure precisely by the cultural rise of 
minorities (and women).5
3 Oscars: In the 1970s, nonwhites made up 4 percent of the nominees and 
zero percent of the winners of the major awards for film performers, but between 
2000 and 2015, they comprised about 15% of both–calculated from data reported 
here: http://labs.time.com/story/oscars-diversity/. Emmys: Calculated from the male
and female best actors in comedy and drama listed in Wikipedia, at 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_black_Primetime_Emmy_Award_winners_and_no
minees. Football: Freedman (2014).
4 E.g., happiness (Blanchflower and Oswald 2017, fig. 4) and mortality (Case 
and Deaton 2017).
5 By now, many studies have documented that Trump’s core voters were 
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Valorizing Individual Economic Attainment. The deepest damage done 
by neoliberalism for Lamont is its rewriting of the “scripts of the self .... [to] 
emphasize material success, social status, competitiveness, and the 
privatization of risk (or self-reliance)” (p. 10 in draft]). Two empirical and one
explanatory question arise: Has emphasis on material success increased? 
Has emphasis on self-reliance increased? And, if they have, are they due to a
rising neoliberalism or something else?
Observers have for centuries described Americans as notably 
materialistic and acquisitive. “The desire to acquire the good things of this 
world is the dominant passion among Americans. . . . Americans cleave to 
the things of this world as if assured that they will never die,” wrote 
Tocqueville in the 1830s. Any change over the generations has probably 
been toward somewhat less materialism (see review in Fischer, 2010, Ch. 3). 
Indeed, there is an entire school of thought that sees the era since the 1960s
as one of “post-materialism” (e.g., Inglehart and Welzel 2005). 
Lamont’s evidence on changes in American materialism since 
neoliberalism is mostly cross-sectional. Some survey data do suggest 
suffered not from economic distress but cultural distress–racism, but also fear of 
liberated women, educated elites, and urban dwellers. I review some of the 
literature in two blog posts: 
https://wordpress.com/post/madeinamericathebook.wordpress.com/5330 and  
https://wordpress.com/post/madeinamericathebook.wordpress.com/6020. 
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increases in valuing financial success among youth6 and the wider public, 
although the trend may reflect both the unusual character of the 1960s and 
fluctuations in economic stresses–notably 1970s stagflation and the Great 
Recession (Fischer, 2010, pp. 90ff). Other data are mixed. For example, 
Lamont writes about materialist distortions of the American Dream. Surveys 
conducted in 1986 of the general population and in 2015 of young adults 
asked what they thought the “American Dream” meant. Least popular each 
year was “to be able to become wealthy,” it was especially unpopular among
the 2015 young.7 Evidence of a connection between neoliberalism’s 
ascendance and average Americans’ materialism is mixed.
American emphasis on self-reliant individualism runs yet deeper. Belief
in the “sovereign” freely choosing self–both as a description of human nature
6 Lamont leans on the UCLA survey of American Freshman (Egan, et al., 
2018). One of their indicators of materialism, whether “being very well financially 
off” was a very important life objective, did show major increases from the 1960s to
2010s, from about 40 to about 80 percent agreeing (while, for example, “helping 
others” stayed level from about 65 to about 70 percent; pp. 83ff). Another indicator,
however, preferring a business major rose rapidly from the 1960s to the 1980s and 
then dropped back to roughly its 1960s level by the 2010s (pp. 20ff; seeking 
biological or health majors, and being undecided have risen a lot).
7 iPoll archives 
(https://ropercenter.cornell.edu/CFIDE/cf/action/home/index.cfm): Polls 
USROPER.86DRM.R11A and USSSRS.120115F.R02F. Most popular in 1986 were a 
high school education, freedom of choice, and owning a home; most popular for the 
young in 2015 were starting one’s own business, sending children to college, and 
freedom of choice.
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and as a norm for human action–has been seen as fundamental from before 
Tocqueville to now (and noted by many observers). Despite the global reach 
of American culture, Americans even today remain in this way distinctive–for 
example, in asserting that people determine their own fates, especially, their
own economic fates, that the poor are poor because they do not try and the 
rich are rich because they work hard (e.g., Fischer 2008;  Alesina, 
Stantcheva, and Teso, 2018, fig. 7).
In recent generations, more Americans have claimed for themselves 
the independence presumed by the ideology of self-reliance (Fischer 2010; 
Shammas, 2002). Those who were not white male propertied heads of 
households slowly gained what Early Americans called “competency” or 
“virtue,” the material and legal independence which allows people to be self-
determining, self-creating, and indeed self-reliant (Vickers, 1990). One 
example of such gains is the rise since the 19th century of married women’s 
rights–rights to property, to affection, to divorce, and to children after 
divorce. Another example is the growing independence of the young and the 
aged in, for example, being able to live alone. And of course, the history of 
blacks in America is another example. With the democratization of power 
came a democratization of “self-fashioning”–conscious work on self-
improvement. Has post-1960s neoliberalism accelerated these trends? 
Perhaps. The research Lamont cites on growing “self-perfectionism” among 
college students (Curran and Hill 2017) would be consistent.
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More specifically, has neoliberalism amplified the power and popularity
of individualistic explanations of economic fortunes? To be sure, some 
American policies toward the poor since the 1970s seemed punitive–the 
1996 welfare reform act, imposition in some places of drug-testing for 
receiving assistance, and the like. Yet, most evidence suggests that 
Americans have not increasingly bought into the market ideology. In the last 
40-plus years, surveyed Americans have steadily or even increasingly 
reported that inequality is growing and that America is dividing into haves 
and have-nots, seen it as not necessary for prosperity but instead as a boon 
to the “rich and powerful,” and have said that they wanted something done 
about it.8 Similarly, Americans’ attitudes toward the poor and assistance to 
the poor, although harsher than those of other westerners, have changed 
little in several decades, perhaps in a liberal direction.9
8McCall (2013); this blog post: 
https://wordpress.com/post/madeinamericathebook.wordpress.com/3996 . Lamont 
cites Mijs (2018) showing growing acceptance of the idea that “people get ahead by
hard work” (rather than by luck or help from others)–the GSS item “GETAHEAD.” 
That is only one item. Another GSS item shows a small increase in those who say 
that one needs to “know the right people” to get ahead (OPKNOW) and no change 
in the need to come from a “wealthy family” to get ahead (OPWLTH). Over the 
range of GSS questions over the last 40 years, there is no general move toward 
libertarian interpretations and maybe the opposite.
9 For example, Pew found a 5-point increase between 2014 and 2018 in 
attributing wealth to hard work. But L.A. Times polls found a 7-point decrease 
between 1985 and 1995 in labeling most poor people as lazy (items in the iPoll 
archives).
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In sum, my reading of the data is that the “sovereign self” 
understanding of society has long been a distinctive part of American culture
and supportive of “free market” economic ideology. And its hold has spread 
over the course of American history. Yet, there is not much evidence to 
believe that the recent rise of market policies and ideologies themselves 
have substantially shifted the general public’s views.
Upper-Middle-Class Angst. Lamont’s argument here is that the upper 
middle class (UMC) has distinctively suffered because of neoliberal culture; it
demands too much of its members and they demand too much of 
themselves. Alternatively, I would agree that growing economic inequality 
and insecurity have pained almost everyone; and concede that the 
hollowing-out of middle class jobs together with the extension of the highest 
reaches of the class pyramid have raised the stakes–and the stress–for the 
UMC; and yet nonetheless argue that this class still suffers less, increasingly 
less, than does the working class. Lamont diagnoses the problem as cultural 
change, to which the UMC as particularly vulnerable. Alternatively, the 
problem is material change, to which the working class is particularly 
vulnerable.
In support of her argument, Lamont cites reports of growing stress 
among college students, presumably because they are UMC. But of course 
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many, probably the most stressed, students are not (yet) UMC. Lamont also 
cites a study of rates of depression between 2005 and 2015 (Weinberger et 
al 2018). But, while most income groups in this very large national survey 
showed small elevations, the poorest group worsened more than did the 
richest.10 An online 2018 survey of stress found, as did the just-cited 
depression study, the highest rates among the young. What younger 
respondents were especially likely to report as stressors were 
overwhelmingly material concerns: work, money, debt, and health (American
Psychological Association 2018, pp. 5-9). Similarly, differences between 
classes (or between the college graduates and others as a proxy for class) 
have widened, not narrowed, in: family stability, labor force participation, 
alcohol consumption, happiness, optimism, and mortality.11 The UMC has not 
10 Calculations from the Weinberger et al  (2018) supplement: The upward 
slope for the poorest was .152 percentage points per year and for the richest, .088 
(the base rates being inversely associated with income).  The only educational 
category to show an increase were those with “some college”–which may include 
many youth. The only large changes occurred among young people (answers 
indicating depression rising from 8 or 9 percent up to 11 to 13 percent for teens, a 
smaller increase for young adults), women, and whites.
11 Family: class differences have widened in divorce and children living 
without two parents (F-H paper; Rakin and Gibson-Davis 2018). Men’s labor force 
participation: Kreuger (2017, fig. 5) . Alcohol: problem drinking in the early 2000s: 
Grant et al (2017). Happiness: Blanchflower and Oswald (2017). Optimism: Lamont 
cites a study (p. 13, n 25; p. 25) showing a growing difference by education in 
confidence that people can achieve the American Dream.  Mortality: Case and 
Deaton (2017) have revised their analysis of “despair mortality” among the white 
working class since their original paper garnered much criticism. In their latest 
analysis (Case and Deaton, 2017, fig. 7), there is a clear class divergence in such 
Fischer  on  Lamont  /
p. 11
been more psychologically wounded by neoliberalism than the working class.
Such data, then, turn our attention from a cultural dynamic, the spread
of neoliberal ideology, to a material one, the falling behind economically 
(and, as a consequence, socially12) of large segments of the working class.
Speaking to the broader diagnosis that Lamont provides, evidence 
suggests two overarching conclusions: (1) Not everything is about 
economics. The weakening of racial barriers and the rising status of 
minorities in America is a distinctive story. Another, related story is the 
democratization of “competency.” Others besides propertied white men have
become independent. (2) When economics is a driving factor–and it certainly 
is critical–it is because of economic (in)security more than economic culture 
or ideology (Fischer 2010, Ch. 2).
Notes on “Prescription”
Lamont recommends moves toward a culture in which, to borrow from 
Martin Luther King, Jr., people would be judged not by the size of their 
wallets, “but by the content of their character.” Many attainments would be 
just as valued as economic success, attainments that could be reached by 
mortality rates.
12 I allude to the literature on growing social disengagement among the lower 
working class, especially men.
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all–like friendship, civic virtue–and that would help de-stigmatize the 
stigmatized. These are worthy goals. But I raise two general questions.
One: To what extent have Americans already been moving, over the 
longue duree, in this direction? I noted earlier the evidence on the de-
stigmatization of minorities. As to de-valorizing wealth, compare the rigid 
status hierarchies described in early-twentieth-century community studies 
such as Yankee City,  Jonesville, and Caste & Class in a Southern Town to the
jeans-wearing, informalization of contemporary American culture.
Two: Can we insure that other standards of evaluation besides the 
economic do not become just as competitive, oppressive, and stressful? 
There’s the “most popular girl” competition familiar in American high schools
and the “most pious” competition in some religious communities. Consider 
the furious reactions of some Americans to what they took to be Hilary 
Clinton’s description of them as “deplorables” and to Barak Obama’s 
description of them as “bitter . . . cling[ing] to guns or religion or antipathy 
toward people who aren’t like them or anti-immigrant sentiment or anti-trade
sentiment as a way to explain their frustrations.” Indeed, “class” resentment 
not of money snobbery but of other snobberies–education, cultural tastes, 
cosmopolitanism–also fuels the Trump movement. Can invidious distinctions 
be avoided?
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Closing
Lamont has provided a valuable view of current crisis in western 
societies. I agree that the triumph of free-market partisans and the defeat of 
labor since about 1980 has both riven our societies and poisoned civic life. 
We disagree only, in the American case, at least, on the relative weight to 
give to the cultural versus the material dynamics in these changes.
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